The existence of peer-to-peer networks is due to benefits brought by decentralization of control and distribution of resources. It is expected that the usage of such networks will grow and provide support for a variety of applications, including collaborative environments. Since entities participating in those networks are autonomous and therefore free to decide on their level of participation, mechanisms to resolve conflicts between individual and collective rationality are needed. How can implementations of such mechanisms be compared? This paper introduces INCA (INCentive frAmework), a qualitative reference framework, highlighting essential elements and major design decisions in any implementation of incentive mechanisms. In the context of collaborative environments built on top of P2P architectures, the reference framework can be used in assessing the impact on the quality of experience (QoE) of applications when incentive mechanisms are included.
INTRODUCTION
In contrast to a client-server model where servers provide services to clients, a peer-to-peer model (P2P) dictates that an entity should act both as a server and a client with respect to other entities. If providing a service entails costs, then the entity acting as a server should expect some form of compensation, or more generally, should have an incentive to offer this service. Incentive mechanisms are however neither fully understood, nor effectively deployed on existing popular P2P networks, with the result that many entities choose to act solely as clients (free-riders) [2] .
Although incentive mechanisms are well documented in business, economy and sociology literature [6] , their application to peer-to-peer networks is relatively new. Issues such as improvement of cooperation using techniques from economics and social sciences, applicability of various market models and viability of different revenue models in peer-to-peer networks were recently addressed in [38] , [34] and [21] . The fundamental difficulty in deploying incentive mechanisms rests in ensuring that they are resilient to failures and robust against malicious entities [16] . Since entities are expected to be independent and rational, there is no guarantee that they will adhere to a given protocol or mandated strategy [36] , [28] . Ensuring that an incentive mechanism is not subverted is complicated by the nature of current peer-to-peer networks, where an entity can join a network with an easily obtainable identity [27] , [17] , and [14] .
Some file-sharing peer-to-peer networks do not deploy incentive mechanisms, and yet are very successful. It is natural then to ask if incentive mechanisms are truly necessary and not purely of academic interest. It can be argued that the success of file-sharing applications also depends on other factors besides the level of free-riding. The cost of providing services (files) on existing file-sharing networks is close to zero and the expected quality of service correspondingly low. Coupled with the compelling nature of the exchanged files, this creates a very useful network for entities to join. However, if the cost of providing services or the demanded quality of service rises, it is unlikely that a peer-to-peer network without an incentive mechanism can be successful.
Large numbers of free-riders on the peer-to-peer network bring up questions about the viability of the network in general, and about its usefulness to other participating entities in particular [23] . As argued in [40] , benefits of peerto-peer networks manifest themselves in massive diversity. When an entity free-rides, it contributes to the reduction of this diversity, and therefore to the decrease of usefulness of peer-to-peer networks [8] . Whenever rational decisions made by an individual entity negatively impact the utility of other entities, incentives (i.e. reward or punishment) become necessary to ensure that the usefulness of a peerto-peer network does not diminish. Practical implications of incentive mechanisms thus relate to increasing collaboration and availability of services, and target applications such as file-sharing [26] , [11] , distributed storage [29] and streaming [19] .
In the context of collaborative environments built on top of P2P architectures, incentive mechanisms will therefore have an impact on deployed applications. A natural interest then is in the understanding of this impact, and in deriving a quantifying measure of its effect. A lack of common reference point leads to difficulty in comparing characteristics and performance of incentive mechanisms. In order to compare these characteristics, a reference framework is presented in this paper. This framework presents elements common to all incentive mechanisms, and choices available for their design. We further outline one possible way of deriving a quantifying measure, based on the quality of experience (QoE) of applications as perceived by the user.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present a review of related work. We describe the framework in section 3. An evaluation of the framework based on existing incentive mechanisms is presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
RELATED WORK
The body of literature describing frameworks for incentive mechanisms encompasses both quantitative and qualitative studies. In the latter case, [30] considers distributed systems composed of autonomous entities co-operating to achieve their goals. Authors observe that incentive schemes play a central role, and propose a classification of incentive patterns. Matching these incentive patterns with specific application environment allows for a more systematic approach to the design of incentive schemes.
Quantitative studies typically analyze incentive mechanisms in the context of game theory [32] . The performance of three different incentive schemes, token-exchange, peerapproved and service-quality, is analyzed in [31] by defining and using a model based on Multi-Person Prisoner's Dilemma. A generalized form of Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma model is used to study cooperation in peer-topeer networks [24] . Authors conclude that even with unfettered and decentralized creation of identities, adaptable incentive mechanisms can produce systems that converge to full cooperation. Furthermore, scalability and security of networks is addressed in the context of private and shared history of entities' actions. A formal game theoretic model for systems relying on centralized servers is presented in [18] , and provides an analysis of equilibrium of user strategies for various payment schemes. With the view to assess and evaluate incentive systems in peer-to-peer networks, [4] presents a model of utilities obtained by entities, and various schemes to address the lack of incentives. Analytical expressions are provided for cases where there is a lack of complete payoff information and an inability to individually compensate entities. Authors' main findings relate to the size of the network and variability of entities' utility functions. Another study presents a discussion of Nash equilibrium for a non co-operative game between strategic players [9] . Assuming that the probability of obtaining a service from a producer depends on the contribution of a consumer (its production), this study addresses cases when the benefit to a peer from other entities' contribution is common to all, and when the benefit is specific to each peer.
In networks with autonomous and transient entities, the supply and demand of services is likely to fluctuate. It would be desirable to design incentive mechanisms to take into account the dynamics of peer-to-peer networks, offer-ing higher compensation for scarce services, and lower for abundant ones. More generally, for each entity having a set of strategies and preferred outcomes, the challenge is to design a utility function that at equilibrium yields a certain desirable network property [15] . This, in essence, is the domain of mechanism design. Work presented in [41] designs a utility function, and provides a solution using control theoretic approach.
REFERENCE FRAMEWORK

Reference Framework Elements
All the incentive mechanisms have the following elements. Four of those elements are essential, and one is optional.
Motivation. There must be a clear motivation for entities to interact and collaborate. Usually, motivation is provided by a prospective gain for an entity from joining and participating in a network. Since entities produce and consume services, motivation needs to be assessed from both consuming and producing perspective. This element is therefore concerned with defining the motivation for entities to participate in a peer-to-peer network.
Differentiation. For an incentive mechanism to function properly there must be a concept of differentiation, either of services, quality of service or between entities. Just as we can select a bank with the best terms for a line of credit, and banks can choose to whom and at what rate they extend a line of credit, participants in a peerto-peer network must be capable of observing and acting upon perceived differences. This element is therefore concerned with the manner in which differentiation is defined and made accessible to participating entities.
Peer Selection. The goal of this element is the selection of an entity (or entities) most likely to lead to a successful interaction. In certain applications it is possible, indeed desirable, to obtain services from multiple entities concurrently, or to dynamically seek out better entities to interact with. In those cases, this element acts as "glue" for the differentiation and utility calculation elements. In other cases, it might not be necessary to include this element in incentive mechanisms.
Utility Calculation. Defining an entity's perception of derived utility from producing or consuming services is one of the fundamental issues for an incentive system. It is however possible to come up with potentially infinite number of definitions since the exact utility derived by an entity can depend on targeted application, various assumptions about available knowledge or conditions, or even intangible factors. This element is therefore concerned with the characteristics of objective functions rather than their specific definitions.
Metric Scope. Some parameters are necessary for the preceding element. Incentive mechanisms may choose various parameters as metric, depending on the target application or availability of variables. Combining different parameters into a composite parameter is also possible. The metric can also be thought of as a proxy, or store of value, for services rendered or consumed. The main concern of this element is the scope of the metric within the peer-to-peer network, and not its specific definition.
Elements describing characteristics of incentive mechanisms are presented in Fig. 1 . They are represented as layered one on top of another to highlight their interdependency.
Motivation
Understanding why an entity should interact and collaborate with another entity is paramount to building effective incentive mechanisms.
Two popular file-sharing peer-to-peer networks, Kazaa [25] and BitTorrent [10] allow users to exchange files. Their protocols for doing so are different, but in both cases we can think of the offered service as the permission to upload contents from a storage device using some (preset) bandwidth. In the first network, an entity can access offered services while not offering any services itself. An attempt to distinguish between classes of entities based on their participation level was defeated by the release of a software client implementation (e.g. KazaaLite) which always reported its participation level as the maximum defined. In the second network, entities are rewarded with faster download speed in proportion to how fast they allow other entities to upload from them. An entity however can easily receive more services than it actually produces by disconnecting from the network after receiving the requested file.
It can be argued that these two networks do not have robust enough incentive mechanisms, and a quick look at supply and demand curves illustrates the problem. Considering the price of consuming a service to be close to zero, the demand for this service can grow arbitrarily high. Since the price of supplying a service remains constant regardless of the quantity supplied, the equilibrium point would then be at an arbitrarily high level of the quantity of service. Assuming that the number of entities willing to supply a given service for free is limited, a gap between the quantity of service supplied and demanded will result. The net effect is that a number of consumers will not be able to fulfill their need for a service. Furthermore, every time a service is provisioned, the server entity incurs a cost that decreases its ability to keep offering services. If the peerto-peer network does not continuously add such producer entities, then the network's capacity to offer services also decreases. It then follows that each entity consuming a service reduces the utility of the network to other consumer entities. A situation where there is a mismatch between supply and demand, and where each fulfilled demand reduces the utility of all, but where all consumer entities are marginally better in the short-term by consuming as much as they can, will potentially lead to the "tragedy of the commons", or in other words, the collapse of the peer-topeer network. If such a drastic outcome does not come to pass, we are still faced with the issue of entities consuming more of the free services than their "fair share", or by choosing to restrict their contribution to the network, to avoid contributing their "fair share" of the cost. Such entities would in fact get a free-ride on the peer-to-peer network.
In effective incentive mechanisms, an entity should expect to either give or receive some form of compensation. Producers willing to offer services for free do exist, for example as a promotional give-away or as a loss leader strategy. Similarly, entities consuming a free service may decide to make a donation, in effect buying a service from a producer. Those examples however remain an exception rather than the rule, and entities will consume services for free if they can, while producers would prefer a more predictable revenue stream.
An obvious form of compensation is an exchange of money for the service, just as in the case of cash or credit card usage. Payment systems assume the existence of a currency that can be used outside of the network. Participating peers then have a motivation to offer services in order to receive this currency. If entities are capable of making properly informed choices in deciding on the appropriate level for the price of a service, then free riding should not exist. Such systems assume the existence of a robust framework for payment processing, which in peer-to-peer networks presents issues of its own such as, for example, reliable accounting mechanisms [20] . An example of an implementation based on a payment system is outlined in [5] .
If there is no payment system, then entities can be motivated to participate in a network by either "greed" or "fear", or possibly a combination of both. On one hand, an entity may be enticed to contribute to the network by threats of sanctions and restrictions. Methods in this branch would work best in the context of networks where membership is restricted and participants have a well-known identity, such as communities or clubs. Ideas outlined in [35] could be applied to a potentially open and anonymous membership, and are based on client puzzles that participants might be asked to solve in exchange for services. On the other hand, an entity's intrinsic need or desire (eagerness) to obtain a service may be leveraged. Methods in this branch can assume that participating entities freely decide on the level of their participation. An entity might be eager to, for example, obtain some files Motivation from a file-sharing network, or store its data on the network in such manner that it is both secure and highly available.
Another form of compensation can be based on trade, or payment-in-kind. Entities trade if they allow access to each other's storage, bandwidth or computing power. A producer node can be compensated with another service or a promise of a service in the future. In both cases, entities are required to assign a value to their services, especially if these are not heterogeneous. In the first case, entities barter (negotiate) or allocate some portion of their capacity to perform a service for other services, while in the second case a producer entity obtains a voucher redeemable at a later time from the network or the consuming entity. Such vouchers must be worthless outside of the network. The motivation element can therefore be based on some concept of "proxy" currency, on barter or some combination of those characteristics. If there is no trading between entities, or in some cases trading takes place but is inefficient, a situation allowing extensive free-ride exists, creating an unbalanced network.
Whenever there is potential to receive something tangible, such as money or service, participating entities have a motivation to collaborate. Fig 2 presents key design choices for the motivation element of incentive mechanisms. Points "A" is where an entity can be expected to be motivated to collaborate in a network. Point "B" illustrates two common problems, tragedy of the commons and free-riding.
Differentiation
The ability of a network to provide differentiation of services, quality of service or between entities is necessary for designing viable incentive mechanisms. The concept of differentiation is not dependent on what exactly is chosen as basis to assess differences. Without loss of generality Two main choices exist for differentiation. The first, already familiar to most shoppers, places the burden of describing a service and its cost on producers. Consumers then need to understand what is offered, and how to compare offers. The second involves producers calculating what class of service to offer to consumers. These calculations can be based on factors such as credentials supplied by consumer, the result of optimization of an objective function, or a combination of those two methods. For example, in the case of a customer with a bad credit history, a bank might decide to extend a line of credit at a punishing interest rate, if at all.
In the case of the first choice, we can further analyze this element based on which entity describes a particular service. In the simplest form, an entity is responsible for making its own claim [13] . Claims can also be made by a third-party, which can be trusted to varying degrees. If the third-party is not fully trusted, incentive mechanisms can rely on referral or reputation infrastructures [39] , [42] , [37] , and [12] . If the third-party is fully trusted, design of incentive mechanisms becomes easier but at the expense of shifting complexity to the design and deployment of the trusted third-party itself.
The second choice implements an explicit reward and punishment mechanism. Producers can make decisions based either on their personal goals, or on some common group-specific goals. In the latter case, a group of producers ensures similarity of service offered to comparable consumers. Since the consumer does not know a priori what quality of service to expect, its natural behavior will be to try different producers and keep the best one. Fig. 3 presents key design choices for the differentiation element. By introducing the notion of receiving something tangible in compensation for services in the preceding layer, we automatically require the concept of differentiation in an incentive system. This element therefore describes the manner in which differentiation is defined and made accessible in the network.
Peer Selection
Peer selection element is the "glue" that holds the differentiation and utility calculation elements together, and In simple cases where a consumer is presented with a choice of producers, peer selection reduces to selecting a producer that maximizes an objective function of the consumer. Similarly, if the differentiation element is defined by a probability function for a producer, the peer selection element reduces to the choice of serving or not serving a particular consumer.
Why is the peer selection element important then? Considering the transient nature of entities in a peer-to-peer network, we immediately see that some producers who are providing a service to consumers can leave the network, or new producers with possibly better qualifications can join the network. It would be beneficial for consumers to be able to monitor and seek out better partners for interaction and collaboration. This is also the case when producers select consumers with whom to interact. In instances where a producer optimizes an objective function, it might obtain better results if it replaces some consumers by others.
The goal of this element is the selection of an entity most likely to lead to a successful interaction. The basic design choice defines whether an entity's interaction with other entities is static or dynamic.
Utility Calculation
Selection of a utility function is one of the fundamental decisions for an incentive mechanism as it will influence all interaction and collaboration between entities. Each entity could define its own utility function, but for the sake of clarity, we will assume that such functions will be defined in terms of specific applications' requirements, or based on well defined goals. In [3], for example, this function is defined in terms of cost and requirements as specified by parallel downloading or streaming of audio/video objects. In [7] on the other hand, this function tries to minimize the time necessary to select the best source for a file download.
Despite the potentially unlimited number of utility functions, the basic design choice of the utility calculation element is quite simple and is illustrated in Fig. 5 . Each entity will optimize an objective function that results in highest utility as perceived by itself, or by a group. In the former case, each entity is independently making rational decisions, and hence exemplifies a "free-for-all" concept. In the latter case, each entity is making decisions that are rational in a collective context, and thus tries to optimize "social welfare" of the group. A group can be the whole or some subset of a peer-to-peer network. This element therefore defines the characteristic of the chosen utility function, whether an entity explicitly acts in its own interest or the interest of some group.
Metric Scope
This element includes the definition of parameters used in the utility calculation element. For example, in the case of file-sharing or network storage applications entities can exchange information about their available upload bandwidth or available disk space. Quite often, it is very helpful to think of this layer as defining a "proxy", or an intermediate store-of-value used in valuation of services exchanged between entities. This occurs for example in reputation frameworks, where an entity is judged by others depending on their reputation. Reputation itself can change depending on the amount and quality of supplied services. The basic design choice of this element is illustrated in Fig. 6 . Although many metrics can be used, the basic characteristic of this element is the scope of such metrics within peer-to-peer networks. A group in a network can share the same metric, or each entity can create and use its own. Referral systems are examples of systems that need to carefully manage the semantics of metrics, while simple machine-learning implementations use metrics that have local meaning only.
If the chosen metric is an abstract concept such as 'reputation' or 'trust', a corresponding model, associated data structures and operations need to be defined. Work presented in [1] assists users in identifying trustworthy entities, and gives them the ability to enhance their understanding of other entities' subjective recommendations. A method to assign each entity in a network a unique global trust value in a distributed and secure manner is presented in [22] , and works by aggregating local trust scores of all entities, reflecting their experience with a specific entity.
The main concern of this element is therefore the scope of the metric within the peer-to-peer network. In cases where a group of entities share a metric, this element may also be concerned with storing and managing metric information in a decentralized manner.
INCA EVALUATION
Addition of incentive mechanisms to collaborative environments built on a peer-to-peer architecture has the potential to increase the robustness of various applications. To compare relative qualities of incentive-enabled systems many QoS parameters can be used, but ultimately, the level of satisfaction of a user will determine if a system is good or not [33] . The experience of a user while interacting with a particular collaborative environment can be quantified in a single measure, the Quality of Experience (QoE). This measure is in most cases a function of multiple variables, and is quite complex since it takes into account user's perception of interaction.
Incentive mechanisms will impact the user's perception of the interaction in various ways. In order to start defining quantitative parameters, four questions can be asked:
• Does the user's benefit increase with increasing contribution?
• Do users with lower level of contribution receive lower benefit?
• Is a change in contribution reflected on the user's benefit in a timely manner?
• Is the received benefit stable if the contribution level is also stable?
In general, if the answer is negative to those questions, the incentive mechanism does not improve the QoE as perceived by the user. The following discussion presents four examples of incentive mechanisms and how their characteristics may impact QoE.
INCA and Game Theoretic Approach to File Sharing
Work presented in [26] strives to offer service differentiation dependent on the amount of each entity's contribution to the peer-to-peer network. Motivation In this case, peers trade by means of a proxy, present production for future consumption. Consumers compete for resources provided by the producer. The producer allocates more resources to the consumer whose contribution level is higher relative to other competing consumers.
Differentiation Each entity has publicly available credentials supplied by a trusted third-party. Producers use these to calculate how many resources should be offered to a consumer, depending on the group currently being served. Producers' differentiation is not specifically addressed, but since their contribution levels and available bandwidth are known, consumers can presumably devise strategies that take this information into account.
Peer selection Peer selection is not discussed from consumers' perspective: it is ancillary to the differentiation element. Producers tolerate joining and leaving consumers, and stop interacting with a consumer that does not provide proof of service. Producers attempt to distribute their resources according to a specific formula among all consumers, but do not make any attempt to interact only with a subset of requesting consumers; as such producers have a static peer selection element: it is subordinate to the utility calculation element.
Utility calculation Consumers' utility calculation is not explicitly discussed. Instead, if consumers follow the given protocol (and have a non-zero contribution level), they can be guaranteed a share of resources as calculated by the producer. The producer computes consumers' utilities and tries to optimize for all connected consumers. By maximizing the sum of connected consumers' utilities, a producer guarantees to maximize its contribution level. A producer is in fact maximizing its contribution level by maximizing the utilities of connected peers.
The producer assumes that each connected consumer has the following utility function: U i (x i ) = log xi bi + 1 where x i ∈ [0, b i ] and is the allocated resource to consumer i, and b i is the requested resource by consumer i. The producer then performs the following constrained optimization: max for i = 1..., N is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, the authors prove that the resource allocation to consumers (x i ) maximizes the producer's contribution level.
Metric scope Metric is based on globally known quantities: contribution level of an entity (C i ), and the amount of bandwidth resource provided by a producer (W Ai ). The contribution level is calculated based on evidence of rendered service: digitally signed requests for a specific amount of resource from a consumer (b i ).
Analysis
This section highlights some further research areas for the preceding publication based on INCA.
• The same consumer might be offered varying amounts of resources by different producers since at equilibrium b * i = x * i for i = 1..., N and which depends on the contribution level of all connected consumers to a particular producer offering W A . It would be in the consumers' best interest to search for the most accommodating producer. This can lead to an impact on the overhead communication between entities.
• Producers do not necessarily need to maximize their contribution level, and can simply provide some resources to a consumer for its contribution level to go up. The resulting contribution level might be enough to satisfy an entity that subsequently wishes to consume resources (it is guaranteed not to be resourcestarved). This is due to the fact that a producer does not know a consumer's true utility function, assuming U i (x i ) = log xi bi + 1 instead. If such a situation occurs and is persistent, then an entity, even conforming to all of the protocol's rules, cannot be guaranteed to receive its fair share of resources undermining the basic premise of the motivation element.
• If there is no concept of decay of the contribution level, producers can build it up and then free-ride, undermining the basic premise of the motivation element.
• Over the long term, and as contribution levels of entities increase, new participants might have to offer resources for a long time before they can successfully compete with more established consumers. This could be unfair and would undermine the basic premise of the motivation element.
• Producers are interested in maximizing their contribution level. Maximizing the sum of consumers' utilities is a more complicated way of just maximizing the usage of offered service: a producer might find it more expedient to provide resources to only one consumer if b i ≥ W A rather than calculating precise allocations to multiple consumers. By not following the prescribed mechanism, such producers would undermine the basic premise of the motivation element.
• Two entities can collude by sending evidence of an improbably high allocation of resources. An entity would then have a very high level of contribution since there is no way to verify or exclude that evidence. Such a security loophole would undermine the basic premise of the motivation element.
• Rare files vs. popular files: if an entity shares rare files -generating less demand for its resources -its contribution level might be smaller than if it were offering popular files. In order to increase its contribution level, a producer could switch from offering rare files to offering popular files. This can lead to an impact on the diversity offered by the network.
INCA and Incentives in Media Streaming
Work presented in [19] describes an incentive system for peer-to-peer media streaming applications. Based on the insight that random peer selection provides random quality, the authors propose a system in which collaborative nodes are rewarded with higher flexibility in peer selection. Motivation The incentive system is based on participants' score which increases when providing a service. Nodes with a higher score have more flexibility when selecting a producer, which leads to higher streaming quality. Motivation is thus based on proxy trading. Differentiation Entities publish their scores. In order to mitigate potential cheating and collusion, the authors suggest using reputation systems such as [16] or [22] . Producers also differentiate themselves by publishing their availability and offered bandwidth rates which are also required to predict the expected streaming quality.
Peer selection Consumers locate producers willing to provide them with a service. Those producers are classified as active and standby, and the consumer can select producers that best match its requirements at any time. Peer selection is therefore dynamic. Although not explicitly stated, peer selection appears to be dynamic at the producer as well. A producer could for instance stop providing services to an existing consumer if a more suitable consumer made a request.
Utility calculation Entities choose their contribution level in order to maximize their own utility. The utility function is defined as
where Q and C are the quality and cost functions dependent on the contribution level x. The constrained optimization is: max U i (x i ) subject to: U i ≥ 0 for x i ≥ 0 The cost function is based on bandwidth and storage usage C(x i ) = (c L + c T )B out where c L , c T are the unit storage and unit transmission costs respectively, while the quality function is defined as a monotonic non-decreasing in user score, asymptotically reaching a value of Q M AX and having a non-negative initial value Q BestEf f ort . User's contribution first gives a certain score. That score is then compared to the scores of other entities, yielding a certain percentile ranking R i . The resulting quality function is: Q i (R i ) = Q M AX when R i ≥ a, and Ri a (Q M AX − Q BestEf f ort ) + Q BestEf f ort otherwise. By increasing its contribution, a producer expects to increase its ranking as compared to other producers, and thus its quality function.
Metric scope The metric is each entity's score, which is globally known. The score can be computed in different ways, but is a function of the entity's contribution. Supply/demand conditions on the network could be reflected in variable rewards for the same contribution, or a punishment applied for refusing to honor a request. Furthermore, scores can be subjected to decay over time.
Analysis
• An entity will co-operate until it obtains a ranking that makes its quality function equal to Q M AX : increasing costs would make its utility smaller if it continues to co-operate. As other entities co-operate, their score and thus their ranking increase, lowering the relative ranking of the non co-operating entity. By increasing its co-operation, an entity can then maximize its utility. In cases where other entities are also co-operating, an entity might not be able to increase its ranking substantially, while still incurring costs associated with providing services. A situation would then arise where an entity, even willing to co-operate, is better off by not co-operating even when its quality function is close to Q BestEf f ort . This situation of 'score inflation' could be caused by malicious nodes and is illustrated in Fig. 7 .
• Since each entity is responsible for maximizing its own utility, the following situations are valid. An entity with high score can reply to an entity with any score -including lower score. Similarly an entity does not have to honor any request, even if it comes from an entity with higher score. The result is that unless entities have a social conscience and give preference to higher scores, higher scores do not mean that a producer will honor requests for service, or that it won't serve another consumer with a lower score instead, undermining the basic premise of the motivation element.
• Since each entity reports its own score, the temptation to misrepresent it in order to gain an advantage are high since tangible benefits are at stake. Additionally, the risk of collusion between malicious entities needs to be taken into account. The authors identify reputation management systems as a possible solution to those problems. All the scores are then weighted by the degree of trust and/or reputation of the reporting and referring entity. Since both the score and trust-worthiness of an entity reflect its degree of cooperation, collecting scores appears then to be redundant.
• In order to compute the utility function, an entity has to compute its ranking within the network. This computation requires O(σ 2 ) samples, where σ is the standard deviation of the population. This σ is a priori not known, and thus the number of samples taken can introduce variable errors into the calculation of the utility function.
INCA and Incentives in Distributed Storage
An architecture for fair sharing of resources is presented in [29] . It nominally addresses storage resources, but can be extended to bandwidth as well. An incentive system ensures that participating entities can consume only as much resources as they themselves provide in return to the network. A regime of audits is instituted in order to prevent entities from gaining more than their share of resources. Motivation Participating entities can take advantage of resources on the network, provided that they make available an equal amount of resources available to other entities. All well-behaved entities will receive the same service, and in contrast to other systems where a malicious (or free-riding) entity will have its quality of service lowered or curtailed, a non co-operating entity will be expelled from the network. The motivation thus comes from the fear of expulsion.
Differentiation Each entity publishes a usage file, which contains information about its offered service and currently held contracts with other entities. Consumers simply need to find a producer that offers an amount of storage equal to or greater than their storage requirements: producers thus differentiate themselves by self-description. Producers on the other hand need to perform a simple calculation dependent on consumer's request and usage file. All producers perform the same calculation in order to reject consumers that are over their allowed storage quota: consumer differentiation is thus a group-driven calculation.
Peer selection Peer selection is static for both consumers and producers.
Utility calculation Utility calculation is not explicitly discussed by the authors, but is straight-forward. Consumers are only interested in being able to use network's resources whenever they need to, and that is a function of how much resources they offer in return. Producers on the other hand will only provide resources to well-behaved consumers, and as such are concerned with social welfare.
Metric scope As mentioned previously, entities use information contained in the usage file, which is global in scope.
Analysis
• Assuming that identities are not easy to obtain, a malicious peer's identity needs to be propagated throughout the whole network in order to ensure that it cannot enter into a contract with other peers. The main issue however is to ensure that a malicious peer cannot rapidly return with another identity.
• Assume that during a regular audit (where a consumer verifies that its content is truly stored by a given producer), the consumer discovers that the producer is malicious. The producer however passes audits by other consumers. Should the producer be punished (expelled from the network)?
• Following on the preceding point, what happens if a consumer claims -maliciously -that a producer is not storing files it claims to store?
• In order to motivate entities to be truthful, regular and random audits need to be performed. Whereas it is understandable that a consumer would take an interest that its files are properly stored -even at a cost to the consumer, performing random audits is less so. In fact, an entity could free-ride, and let other entities perform random audits. The benefit of performing a random audit accrues to all participants, but the cost is borne only by the auditing parties.
• A consumer, without being malicious, could still obtain more than its fair share of network resources by following this simple scenario: before requesting resources, increase its own offered resources. After allocating its files to producers for storage, decrease its own offered resources. Auditing, both regular and random, would not be able to detect this anomaly.
INCA and Incentives in Content Distribution
In order to improve the performance of data-sharing networks, [11] presents a protocol for creation of selforganizing topologies based on peers' assessment of which direct connections are most likely to result in satisfactory file download. This results in formation of clusters of wellbehaved entities, which have a broader view of the network than non co-operative entities. Motivation It can be argued that motivation in this case is a combination of fear and greed (carrot and stick approach). Knowledge of entities' actions (choice of cooperation or non co-operation) is accumulated throughout the network. After a sufficiently long time, each entity can be judged on the difference between the sum of cooperation instances and the sum of non-co-operation instances.
Differentiation Entities select good peers to connect to based on history of past interactions. Differentiation therefore is based on the result of a calculation by an entity.
Peer selection Peer selection is dynamic. Entities constantly update their connections with peers that maximize their utility function.
Utility calculation All entities are interested in increasing only their own utility. The network is defines as an undirected graph with G = (P, E) where P is the set of entities and E is the set of connections such that c(i, j) = 1 when there is a connection, c(i, j) = 0 when there is no connection, and c(i, i) = 0 for i, j ∈ P . The objective function is defined as Q i = v j=1 c(i, j)s ij subject to j=0 c(i, j) ≤ τ ∀i. The number of satisfactory interactions s ij is defined as s ij = satisf actory(i, j) − unsatisf actory(i, j).
Metric scope Metric is a combination of local trust, connection trust and void downloads. Entities assess other entities' co-operation from their own experience, but do not share this information with other entities; scope of the metric is thus local.
Analysis
• In order to establish connection with well behaved peers, an entity must first learn about the entities it interacts with. This is a function of the size of the network, cycle time -the time it takes to make a decision on the success of an interaction, e.g. downloading a movie is slower than downloading a song, availability of entities -time they spent connected to the network, and the number of connections each peer can have. All of these have an effect on convergence to a state that is stable and/or acceptable to a peer.
• Assuming a stable state is found, entities that join the network will have no history of previous interaction and thus it will be difficult for them to establish links with well behaved peers.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents INCA, a qualitative reference framework for incentive systems. All such systems can be deconstructed into five elements, incentive, differentiation, peer selection, utility calculation and metric scope. Functional and effective incentive mechanism will have all of those elements, except possibly the peer selection element. Each element presents some design choices that will define characteristics of an incentive mechanism. This reference framework can be used in assessing the impact on the quality of experience (QoE) of applications in the context of collaborative environments built on top of P2P architectures, whenever incentive mechanisms are present.
